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Global Warming & Common Law Tort Claims:
Did The Fifth Circuit Open Up Pandora's Box
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA'
NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR
The Note that follows examines the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA.' However, on February 26, 2010, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated that decision by
granting a rehearing en banc." Soon thereafter, a last-minute recusal by a
judge on the 16-judge panel caused the court to lose its quorum to decide
the case."' On May 28, 2010, the court ruled that the vacatur of the three-
judge panel decision was to remain in place. The court also held that the
loss of the quorum left the court with no choice but to dismiss the appeal.v
The dismissal means that the district court's decision - which
held that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that their claims
constituted a "political question"v - stands as good law. So, for now,
plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit cannot pursue state-law tort claims for
damages resulting from an increase in global warming. Still, the parties
were left with the ability to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States.vil
While the Fifth Circuit's original decision is no longer good law,
the Note's analysis of the court's opinion and the discussion thereof
provides an interesting view on the issues of standing and the political
question doctrine in global warming tort cases. Furthermore, the Note
stands in contrast to another Note in this edition of the Missouri
Environmental Law & Policy Review, which examines the case of Native
' 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
'585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); see also 5TH CIR. R. 41.3.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010).
v Id. at 1055.
v Id.
" Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. CIV.A.l:05:CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285,
*1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
"' Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Village of Kivalina v. Extron Mobil Corp.,"". and addresses the same legal
issues found in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA.X For this reason, the editors of
the Missouri Environmental Law & Policy Review felt strongly that this
Note should remain in this edition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina took the lives of
1836 people, making it the third deadliest hurricane in our nation's
history.2 Along with the distressing loss of life, the hurricane also cost the
nation $110 billion in damage, the most of any hurricane ever to hit the
United States.3 With such an overwhelming amount of destruction, many
people were left without homes, and those homes that still stood were
severely damaged. It would be understandable for those who lost so much
to want restitution from someone. Who better to give it to them than the
energy companies that are making huge profits while contributing to the
effects of global warming, thereby increasing the intensity of storms like
Hurricane Katrina?
That is exactly what the plaintiffs thought in Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA. 4 The Fifth Circuit's decision in this case presents a growing trend
among the federal courts of appeals in cases involving the effects of global
warming. Not only are plaintiffs in these types of cases found to have
standing, but their claims are also found not to be political questions, thus
allowing the courts to decide the cases. This Note will examine the Fifth
Circuit's analysis of the doctrines of standing and political question, and
why the court ruled as it did. The Note will also discuss the implications
of the court's decision and the possible outcomes now that the case has
proceeded beyond the pleadings.
vi" 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
x 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).2 http://www.hurricanekatrinarelief.com/faqs.html (follow "What is the death toll of
Hurricane Katrina?" hyperlink).
3 http://www.hurricanekatrinarelief.com/faqs.html (follow "What was the total cost of
Hurricane Katrina?" hyperlink).
4 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, a large group of
residents and landowners along Mississippi's Gulf Coast filed a putative
class action lawsuit against several corporations for their contribution to
global warming.5 All of the named Defendants held their principal places
of business in states other than Mississippi, but conducted business in the
state.6 The plaintiffs alleged that the operation of defendants' various
businesses, which include chemical, energy, and fossil fuel production,
caused the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, thereby
adding to global warming.7  As a result of this alleged increase, the
plaintiffs claimed that sea levels rose, "and added to the ferocity of
Hurricane Katrina, which combined to destroy plaintiffs' private property,
as well as public property useful to them."8
For these reasons the plaintiffs sought both compensatory and
punitive damages.9  They brought six different actions against the
Defendants under Mississippi common law, which included nuisance,
trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
civil conspiracy.' 0 None of the plaintiffs' claims involved federal law, but
the case was brought in federal court by invoking the court's subject
matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship."
In the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the
defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing and
5 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).6 Id. The complete list of Defendants includes: Murphy Oil, USA; Universal Oil Products
and Honeywell Int'l., Inc.; Shell Oil Co.; Exxon-Mobil Corp.; AES Corp.; Allegheny
Energy, Inc.; Reliant Energy, Inc.; Alliance Resource Partners, LP; Alpha Natural
Resources, Inc.; Arch Coal, Inc.; Consol Energy, Inc. Foundation Coal Holdings, Inc.;
Int'l. Coal Group, Inc.; Massey Energy Co.; Peabody Energy Corp.; Westmoreland Coal
Co.; BP American Production Co.; BP Products North America, Inc.; Cinergy Corp.;
Duke Energy Corp.; ConocoPhillips Co.; Dow Chemical Co.; El Dupont De Nemours &
Co.; Entergy Corp.; TVA; Xcel Energy, Inc.; Chevron USA, Inc.; and, American
Petroleum Institute. Id. at 858-59.




0 Id. at 859-60.
" Id. at 860.
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nonjusticiable political questions.12 The district court granted this motion
and dismissed the claims, stating that the court did not have the ability to
address the issues involved with global warming, and also that such policy
decisions are best left to the executive and legislative branches.13
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the plaintiffs did in fact have standing to assert their claims of negligence,
nuisance and trespass, and also held that none of those claims involved a
nonjusticiable political question. However, the court also found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims for civil conspiracy, unjust
enrichment, and fraudulent misrepresentation.' 4
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Standing
Two different types of standing must be satisfied for a court to
exercise its jurisdiction over a particular case.15 The first is constitutional
standing, or Article III standing, which imposes the "case or controversy"
requirement of Article III of the Constitution.16 The second is labeled
"prudential standing," and involves limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction put in place by the judiciary itself.'7 Both types of standing
will now be discussed in turn.
1. Constitutional Standing
Constitutional standing, or Article III standing, is embodied in the
U.S. Constitution under Article 1II, which confines federal court
jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies." 18 These two words "limit the
12 d.
1 Id. The district court's ruling was issued from the bench without a written opinion, so
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the hearing transcripts to ascertain the
district court's reasoning behind its decision. Id. at 860 n.2.
14 d
" Id. at 868.
16 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
17 Comer, 585 F.3d at 868.
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process."' 9  Accordingly, past case law has developed an
"irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" that contains three
elements, enunciated by the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.20
At a minimum, a plaintiff must first establish that it has suffered an
"injury in fact." 21 An "injury in fact" is "an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is" both "concrete and particularized," as well as "actual or
,,22 2imminent. Hypothetical or conjectural injuries will not suffice.23
Second, a plaintiff must be able to show "a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly ...
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court."' 24
The final element laid out by Lujan is that a plaintiff must show that a
25favorable decision by the court is likely to redress the injury. As with
the "injury in fact" element, the redressability of the plaintiffs injury
cannot be merely speculative. 26
Along with the preceding elements, another aspect of
constitutional standing is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing
standing.27 The burden of proof for such a showing will be the same as
any other matter the plaintiff must prove at that particular point.28 As a
result, the consideration of standing at the pleading sta e requires the court
to accept all of the allegations of the complaint as true. 9
The elements of constitutional standing enunciated by the Court in
Lujan were applied in Massachusetts v. EPA, which involved a suit by
several state and local governments, as well as some private organizations,
19 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).




24 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).25 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.26 Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
27 id
28 id.
29 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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challenging the EPA's denial of a petition to begin regulating greenhouse
gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.30 Applying the three-part test for
constitutional standing, the Court held that the state of Massachusetts had
standing to bring its claims.3 1 First, it found that the rise in sea levels
caused by global warming had begun to swallow up the coast of
Massachusetts, and would continue to do so, thereby presenting a concrete
injury to the state.32  Second, the Court said that while the EPA's
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles would not
significantly contribute to global warming, it still would play some part,
and thus causation existed.33 Finally, the Court found that regulating
greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles would redress the injury in
some way, and it did not matter if the plaintiffs' injuries would not be
fully relieved.34
2. Prudential Standing
The doctrine of prudential standing was best articulated in Allen v.
Wright,35 which stated that the doctrine involves "several judicially self-
imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 36 The reasoning
behind the limitations of prudential standing is that such claims, if decided
by the courts, would require them to rule on "abstract questions of wide
public significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights."37
Although these limits have not been fully defined, Allen does
provide some examples of when a case will not meet the standards of
prudential standing. These limitations include: instances in which a
litigant raises the legal rights of another; the plaintiffs complaint does not
30 Massachussetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
" Id. at 526.
32 Id. at 522.
" Id. at 523-25.
34 Id. at 525.
3 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Id. at 751.
3 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
3 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 868 (5th Cir. 2009).
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"fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked"; and
"generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches." 39 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that
"when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm
alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."40 Furthermore,
a plaintiff has to assert her own legal rights and interests, rather than rest
her claim on the legal rights of others.41
B. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is part of a larger concept known as
justiciability.42 As the Fifth Circuit put it, "[a] question, issue, case or
controversy is 'justiciable' when it is constitutionally capable of being
decided by a federal court."4 3  As such, the concept of justiciability
depends larely on the separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution. A case will be nonjusticiable if the Constitution has
committed the subject matter involved exclusively to either the legislative
or executive branches, rather than the courts.45 A political question is a
form of a nonjusticiable issue.46 It is labeled as such because it has been
committed by the Constitution exclusively to the political branches of the
federal government. 47
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court laid out several factors to
consider in determining whether an issue is a political question.48  One
factor is a constitutional provision that expressly commits the issue to a
political branch.4 9 Another factor is "a lack of judicially discoverable and
39 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
40 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
41 id.






48 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
49 id
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manageable standards for resolving" the particular question.5 0  Also, a
case could be a political question if it is impossible to decide without first
making a policy determination that would involve non-judicial
discretion.5 ' An additional factor would be the potential for multiple
decrees from several departments involving the issue that could lead to
embarrassment. 52 The final two factors under Baker v. Carr involve "the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made." 53
The Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States54 developed the
political question doctrine even further. In that case, the Court articulated
a method to be used when determining whether an issue has been
committed to the political branches by the Constitution. 5 The Court said
that the first step is to interpret the constitutional text at issue.56 Following
that, the second step is to "determine whether and to what extent the issue
is textually committed" to one of the political branches.5 7
1. Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."
The Fifth Circuit reviewed Chevron in its decision and stated that
the Defendants had erroneously relied on its interpretation in two other
cases, Calfornia v. General Motors Corp. and Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co. In Chevron, the EPA defended its interpretation of the
statutory term "stationary source," which allowed states to classify all





' 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
ss Id. at 228.
56 id.
57id
5 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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"bubble."5 9 The issue in the case was whether such an interpretation of
the statutory term was reasonable. 60
In deciding this, the Court looked at the legislative history of the
statute in question, and stated:
As always in this area, the legislative struggle was basically
between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution
rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing
the economic concern that strict schemes would retard
industrial development with attendant social costs. The
94th Congress, confronting these competing interests, was
unable to agree on what response was in the public interest:
legislative proposals to deal with nonattainment failed to
command the necessary consensus. 6 1
The Court went on to discuss the deference that should be given to an
agency's decision, and noted that judges are not experts in the particular
fields involved in many cases, but may, "in some cases, reconcile
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal
policy preferences." 62 Furthermore, it stated that "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of...policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones." 63
Ultimately the Court held that the EPA's interpretation of the term
"source" was a reasonable construction of the statute. 64
2. California v. General Motors Corp.65
California v. General Motors Corp., involved a suit brought by the
state of California against multiple automotive manufactures seeking
damages for their contribution to an alleged public nuisance caused by
s9 Id at 840.60id.
6 Id at 847.
62 Id. at 865.6 1 d. at 866.
6 Id.
6s No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
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global warming. 66 The plaintiffs alleged injuries included the erosion of
the state's coastline, increased flooding due to earlier melting of mountain
snow packs, damages caused by increased frequency of extreme heat that
leads to wildfires, and the expenditure of state funds used to respond to all
of these occurrences.67 The defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the
ground that it presented nonjusticiable political questions, claiming,
"Global warming and its causes are issues of public and foreign policy
fraught with scientific complexity, as well as political, social, and
economic consequences." 6 8
The district court, using the Baker formulations, held that it could
not "adjudicate Plaintiffs federal common law global warming nuisance
tort claim without making an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion." 69 In doing so, the court noted that global
warming policy determinations are complex, and must be made by the
political branches before the plaintiffs claim could be properly
adjudicated. 70 The court also looked at Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. and said that "to resolve typical air
pollution cases, courts must strike a balance 'between interests seeking
strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and
interests advancing the economic concern that strict schemes [will] retard
industrial development with attendant social costs."' 7 1 It then went on to
say that balancing those interests in this case would be impossible without
the political branches making an initial policy determination.72
3. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. 73
Several states and private land trusts brought suit against utility
companies for the public nuisance of global warming in Connecticut v.
6 Id. at *1.
67 id.
6 Id. at *2, *5.
69 Id. at *12.70 Id. at *6.
71 Id. at *7 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 847 (1984)).
72 Id at *7.
7 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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American Electric Power Co. 74 The plaintiffs sought damages for their
claim against the defendants, and an injunction requiring the defendants to
cap their emissions of greenhouse gases. 75  The defendants moved to
dismiss the claim, alleging that it presented a nonjusticiable political
question, the court lacked jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs lacked standing. 76
Similar to California v. General Motors Corp., the district court focused
on one Baker formulation in reaching its decision, "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion."77
In determining whether the issue could be decided without an
initial policy determination by the political branches, the court relied on
Chevron, and stated that "to resolve typical air pollution cases, courts must
strike a balance 'between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce
pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the
economic concern that strict schemes [will] retard industrial development
with attendant social costs."' 78 The court went on to say that the issue in
the case was impossible to decide without an initial policy determination
by the political branches. 79  It held that "these actions present
nonjusticiable political questions that are consigned to the political
branches, not the Judiciary."80
4. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.81
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. involved a suit brought by the
State of Ohio against several chemical companies, including one from
Canada, alleging that each dumped mercury into streams that found their
way into Lake Erie, thereby polluting the water. 82 The plaintiffs sought
74 Id. at 267.
" Id. at 270.
76 d
7 7 Id. at 271-72 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).7 8 Id. at 272 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 847 (1984)).
79 id.
so Id. at 274.
8 401 U.S. 493 (1971).82 Id. at 494.
569
GLOBAL WARMING & COMMON LAW TORT CLAIMS
damages for the contamination of the lake, as well as an injunction that
would require the defendants to refrain from dumping any more mercury
into the streams and to remove the mercury already in the lake." The
Court declined to decide the case under its grant of original jurisdiction. 84
However, it did emphasize that the action itself did not present a
nonjusticiable political question, stating that "this Court has often
adjudicated controversies between States ... seeking to abate a nuisance
that exists in one State yet produces noxious consequences in another... In
short, precedent leads almost ineluctably to the conclusion that we are
empowered to resolve this dispute in the first instance."85
5. City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois86
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the states of Illinois and Michigan
brought suit against the City of Milwaukee and various sewage disposal
companies for public nuisance. 87 The States claimed that the discharge of
sewage by the defendants polluted the water of Lake Michigan and
endangered the health of its citizens.88 When the case was first brought,
the Supreme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, but noted,
"federal 'common law'... could give rise to a claim for abatement of a
nuisance caused by interstate water pollution." 89
Soon after, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Act
Amendments of 1972, and the Court agreed to hear the case in order to
decide what effect the new legislation had on the federal common law
claim.90 The Court held that the Clean Water Act preempted the federal
common law remedy of public nuisance.91 However, while the Clean
Water Act prevented a federal common law action for public nuisance, the




86451 U.S. 304 (1981).
"Id. at 308-09.8 Id. at 309.
8 9 Id. at 307, 309 (quoting Illinois v. City ofMilwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 (1972)).
9o City ofMilwaukee, 451 U.S. at 307-08.
91 Id. at 332.
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through state administrative processes, or even... state nuisance law, and
apply them to in-state discharges." 92
With this legal background, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issues
presented in the instant case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Standing
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by stating that since the case
involved state common law rights of action, the plaintiffs had to satisfy the
requirements of both state and federal standing. 93 The court started with
the state standing requirements of Mississippi, and said that the plaintiffs
easily satisfied these standards. 94 The court noted that Mississippi has
traditionally liberal standing requirements because its state constitution
does not limit the judiciary to cases or controversies.95 Instead, the court
noted, parties have standing when they "'assert a colorable interest in the
subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the
conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law."' 96 The court
said that since the plaintiffs alleged harm to their lands and property as a
result of the adverse effects of the defendants' greenhouse gas emissions,
they had state standing to assert all of their claims. 97
The Fifth Circuit went on to analyze the plaintiffs claims under
federal standing requirements, indicating that more rigorous standards
apply. 98 The court began this part of its analysis by explaining the various
rules regarding standing, specifically that Article III of the U.S.
Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies." 99  Additionally, the court pointed out the three part
standing inquiry, stating that at a minimum the plaintiffs must demonstrate
92 Id. at 328.
9 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 2009).
94 Id. at 862.
95 id.
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that "they have suffered an 'injury in fact'; that the injury is 'fairly
traceable' to the defendant's actions; and that the injury will 'likely.. .be
redressed by a favorable decision."' 00 The court also noted that when
deciding standing at the pleadings stage, the court must accept all of the
plaintiff s allegations as true.o10
Before applying these rules to the case, the court stated that it
would be helpful to divide the plaintiff's claims into two separate sets and
apply the standards to each. 0  First the court combined the claims for
negligence, public and private nuisance, and trespass, since all of these
claims relied on "a causal link between greenhouse gas emissions, global
warming, and the destruction of the plaintiffs' property by rising sea levels
and the added ferocity of Hurricane Katrina."'l 03  Second, the court
combined the claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy,
and unjust enrichment, since these claims were based on alleged injuries
resulting from defendants' pricing of petroleum products and public
relations campaigns. 0 4
1. Negligence, Nuisance and Trespass
The Fifth Circuit then applied the standing requirements to the first
group of claims. 05 It stated that the first and third prong of the
constitutional standing requirements were satisfied by the plaintiffs, since
they alleged that they sustained actual damages that could be redressed by
the damages they seek for those injurieS. 106 The court also noted that the
defendants did not contest this issue.1 07 The court went on to discuss
whether plaintiffs had satisfied the second prong of the standing test, that
the injury is traceable to the defendants' actions. 0
100 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).101Id.





107 Id. at 863-64.
'
0
' Id. at 864.
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The court was not persuaded by the defendants' argument that
"plaintiffs' theory tracing their injuries to defendants' actions is too
attenuated," because the argument would re Tuire the court to evaluate the
merits of the claims at the pleadings stage. 9 The court went on to say
that the Article III traceability requirement requires only an indirect causal
relationship as long as a fairly traceable connection exists between the
injury in fact and the defendants' conduct.no0 Since the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged "a chain of causation between defendants' substantial
emissions and plaintiffs' injuries," the court found the traceability
requirement to be satisfied since it was required to assume those assertions
were true."'
Additionally, the court noted that the defendants' contentions were
similar to ones rejected by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.112
Defendants' asserted that the link between their actions and the plaintiffs'
injuries was too attenuated, and contributed only minimally to plaintiffs'
injuries."' The Fifth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts accepted a causal chain almost identical to the one at hand,
and acknowledged that mere contribution to the harm suffices for
traceability requirements. 114 The court also mentioned that in its own
cases it had held that the inquiry in a "fairly traceable test" is whether the
pollutant contributes to the plaintiffs' injuries." 5 The court concluded that
"[b]ecause the injury can be traced to the defendants' contributions, the





112 Id. at 865 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
113 id.
114 Id. at 865-66.
us Id. at 866.
16 Id. at 867.
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2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Civil Conspiracy and Unjust Enrichment
The Fifth Circuit then moved on to the second set of plaintiffs'
claims (fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment) and applied federal prudential standing requirements. "7 The
court began by referring to the Supreme Court's definition of the doctrine
of prudential standing, which "essentially encompasses 'the general
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a
plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.""' 8 The Fifth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs are not identifying
a particular injury that affects them personally, but instead are asserting
the interests of all Americans, since they are alleging a massive fraud on
the political system."l 9 The court concluded that "[s]uch a generalized
grievance is better left to the representative branches," and therefore
denied standing to the plaintiffs on the second set of claims. 120
B. Political Question
After conferring standing for the claims of trespass, nuisance, and
negligence, the Fifth Circuit went on to decide whether the claims
presented a nonjusticiable political question.121 The court began by
defining the terms "justiciability" and "political question." 22 It said that a
case or controversy is "justiciable" when it is "constitutionally capable of
being decided by a federal court." 123 The court went on to say that a case
is not justiciable when the subject matter has been committed by the
Constitution, federal laws or regulations to be in the exclusive dominion of
the legislative or executive branches.124 The court then defined a political
117 Id. at 867-68.
118 Id. at 868 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (emphasis added)).
"
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question as a nonjusticiable issue that has been exclusively entrusted to
another branch of the government, the so-called "political" branches.125
As a result, the court said that in this sense "political" refers not to the
political system, but to the branch of government to which the question is
specifically delegated.12 6
Following this, the Fifth Circuit asserted that the questions in this
case, which involve Mississippi common-law torts, "are justiciable
because they plainly have not been committed by the Constitution or
federal laws or regulations to Congress or the president." 2 7 Additionally,
the court noted that the defendants did not bring to the court's attention
any provision that would have such an effect, and at best could only argue
that Congress may some day enact laws that would govern greenhouse gas
emissions and preempt state common-law tort claims.' 28
From here the Fifth Circuit articulated the ways in which the
political question doctrine has evolved from its original form in Marbury
v. Madison,12 9 to the another standard in Baker v. Carr,130 and to its
current form today.' 3 ' The court said that the Baker "formulations" were
not stand-alone definitions of a political question, but rather guidelines to
be used by federal courts in determining whether a case involves a
political question.' 32 The court went on to say that when deciding whether
a case presents a political question, one must bear in mind the principles of
jurisdiction in federal courts. 33 It said that these principles are that the
judicial branch is supposed to say what the law is, and when a question is
properly brought to the courts it has a duty to decide it. 134 Additionally,
the court said that the political question doctrine is an exception to those
general principles, but "federal courts are not free to invoke the political
125id
126 Id. at 870.
127 id
12 8 id.
129 Id. at 870-71; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
130 Comer, 585 F.3d at 871-72; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
131 Comer, 585 F.3d at 872.
132 id.133id.
134 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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question doctrine to abstain from deciding politically charged cases like
this one." 35
The Fifth Circuit then went on to discuss the history of the political
question doctrine's applicability to common-law tort claims. 3 6 The court
noted that rarely has the doctrine been applied in such cases, and
application is almost always overturned on appeal.' 3 7 The court observed
that three different Circuits have stated that common-law torts, in regards
to political questions, have given the courts clearly defined rules on which
to rely.' 38 Following this, the court stated that while it may not decide a
question that has been exclusively delegated to the political branches, it
"may decide a case that merely implicates a matter within the authority of
a political branch." 39 Additionally, the court stated that it may decide
whether a question is reserved exclusively to the political branches.140
Next, the Fifth Circuit then applied the framework from Nixon v.
US.'4 1 The court said that the only issues presented "are those inherent in
the adjudication of plaintiffs' Mississippi common law tort claims for
damages."l42 No federal constitutional or statutory authority was
presented that would commit any of those issues exclusively to a political
branch, so the court said that the district court's adjudication of the case
was within its authority.143  Additionally, the court stated, since the
defendants' failed to show how any issue presented was within the
exclusive control of the political branches, there was no need to apply the
Baker formulations.144 The court concluded that the underlying policies of
common law tort rules did not present a need for non-judicial policy
determinations in order to decide this case, and the district court's
131 Id. at 872-73.
136 Id. at 873-74.
3 Id at 873 (inteal quotations omitted).
Id at 873 (intemal citations omitted).
1 Id.
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adjudication of the case would not exhibit "any lack of the respect due to
coordinate branches of the federal government."l 45
The Fifth Circuit then addressed the defendants' reliance on
California v. General Motors Corp.146 and Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co., 147 stating that such reliance was "misplaced" for three
reasons.148 First, both decisions were based on a serious misreading of the
Supreme Court's holding in Chevron.14 9 The court said that both cases
had misinterpreted the holding of Chevron to be "that federal courts in air
pollution cases must balance social and economic interests like a
legislative body."15 0 That language, the court said, was merely describing
Congress's legislative process of balancing interests, and "Chevron does
not require federal courts to imitate the legislative process." 1 5  The court
concluded that since both cases used an erroneous reading of Chevron,
their conclusions as to whether the cases before them involved political
questions were also erroneous.1 52
The second reason the court thought the defendants' reliance on
General Motors and American Electric Power was misplaced was because
the application of the political question doctrine in those cases was "at
odds with the Supreme Court's and Congress's treatment of the analogous
issue of transboundary water quality control." 53 The court pointed to
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.15 4 and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois15 5
as the leading support for this argument.15 6 Additionally, the court said
that the assertion that regulatory statutes like the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act preempt states from public nuisance actions has been
consistently shot down.'5 7 In relation to the present case, the court pointed
145 d.
146 No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
147 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).




152 Id. at 877.
153 id.
154 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
11s 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
156 Comer, 585 F.3d at 877-78.
1s7 Id. at 878 (internal quotations omitted).
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out that because the defendants did not assert that any act of Congress had
preempted state law in relation to global warming, it would not "employ
the political question doctrine in a way that would amount to a de facto
preemption of state law."' 5 8
The final reason the court thought the defendants' reliance on
General Motors and American Electric Power was misplaced was because
neither of those cases involved "diversity suits under state common law
between private parties for damages only."l5 9 Instead, the Fifth Circuit
stated, those cases involved actions that states brought based partly on
federal common law and seeking equitable relief.'6  Even with these
distinctions, the court said that neither case presented a political question
because no specific issue was exclusively committed to one of the political
branches by either constitutional or statutory provisions.'61
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had provided
sufficient facts to confer standing for the claims of nuisance, trespass, and
negligence; but not for the claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, civil
conspiracy, or unjust enrichment.162 Additionally, the claims that were
granted standing did not present political questions and were justiciable.163
V. COMMENT
The questions addressed in Comer have important and far-reaching
implications. Not only does the case adopt a new approach to standing
and the political question doctrine, but it also opens the door for private
parties wishing to bring suit against contributors to global warming. The
Fifth Circuit has essentially opened up a new avenue for mass tort
litigation involving global warming. This comment will focus on the
court's analysis of the causation requirement of the standing doctrine, as
well the court's application of the Baker factors in regards to political
questions. It will conclude with a brief discussion on the possible
implications of the court's decision.
"' Id at 878-79.
"
9 Id. at 879.160id.
Id. at 879-80.
'
61 Id. at 880.
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A. Standing
For two reasons, the Fifth Circuit took a new approach to the issue
of causation in a standing context. The first is due to the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.1 64 One aspect of that decision that
played a role in Comer is that the Supreme Court acknowledged global
warming as being a legitimate threat to the earth's climate.16 It stated that
"[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized."l 66 In doing this, the Court recognized an actual injury on the
part of the plaintiffs due to the effects of global warming.167 It legitimized
the States' claims that global warming had negatively affected their
interests. Moreover, the Supreme Court commented in a footnote that the
evidence presented suggested a direct link between global warming and
the ferocity of hurricanes, particularly along the coast of Louisiana.16
The Supreme Court's recognition of such an injury thereby
legitimized the plaintiffs' claim in Comer. The plaintiffs' injuries in
Comer were very similar to those seen in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs
claimed that global warming increased the intensity of Hurricane Katrina,
thus causing more damage to their property.' 69  Similarly, the injuries
alleged in Massachusetts were that global warming brought about
increased ferocity in storms and rising sea levels, which were slowly
swallowing up coastal lands in the plaintiff states.170  Both of these
injuries have their source in global warming. As such, if the Supreme
Court has recognized this type of injury, the Fifth Circuit must also do so.
*6549 U.S. 497 (2007).
165 See id. at 521.
166 id.
16Id. at 521-23.
16Id. at 522 n. 18 ("In this regard, MacCracken's 2004 affidavit-drafted more than a year
in advance of Hurricane Katrina-was eerily prescient. Immediately after discussing the
'particular concern' that climate change might cause an 'increase in the wind speed and
peak rate of precipitation of major tropical cyclones (i.e., hurricanes and typhoons),'
MacCracken noted that '[s]oil compaction, sea level rise and recurrent storms are
destroying approximately 20-30 square miles of Louisiana wetlands each year. These
wetlands serve as a 'shock absorber' for storm surges that could inundate New Orleans,
siificantly enhancing the risk to a major urban population."'). Id.
1 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (2009).
170 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522.
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Another aspect of the Court's decision in Massachusetts that
played a part in the Fifth Circuit's ruling was the recognition of a chain of
causation that mirrors the one found in Comer. In Massachusetts, the
chain involved four steps: (1) the EPA did not regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles; (2) more greenhouse gases were emitted
from automobiles than otherwise would have been; (3) those greenhouse
gases contributed to global warming; and, (4) global warming led to an
increase in sea levels and storm ferocity. 7 1 In Comer, however, the chain
involved one less step. The plaintiffs claimed that: (1) the operation of
defendants' businesses emitted greenhouse gases; (2) those greenhouse
gases contributed to the ferocity and intensity of Hurricane Katrina; and,
(3) Hurricane Katrina destroyed the plaintiffs' property.172
Given the similarities between the alleged injuries in both
Massachusetts and Comer, along with the seemingly identical chains of
causation involved, it is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit would adopt
such a stance. The court's ruling is strengthened even further by the fact
that the chain of causation alleged by plaintiffs involved one less step than
that in Massachusetts. Indeed, the court acknowledged this fact in the part
of its opinion addressing the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs'
injuries lacked traceability to the defendants' actions. The court said, "the
Massachusetts court recognized a causal chain extending one step
further... [a]ccordingly, the defendants' contention here is without merit."
173 In Comer there was no government agency involved; no failure to
regulate that would add another link in the chain. As such, it would seem
that the Fifth Circuit's application of the precedent set in Massachusetts is
right in line with the Supreme Court.
The Comer court's decision is even further strengthened by the
second reason behind its analysis. Comer was brought up on appeal after
the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed at the pleading stage. At the
pleading stage, the court must take the factual allegations of the plaintiff
as true. Furthermore, on a motion to dismiss, the court presumes "that
'. Comer, 585 F.3d at 865.172 d
174 Id. at 860.
175 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'1
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
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general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim." 7 6 When applied to Comer, this means that the court
had to accept as true all of the material facts laid out in the complaint.
So, the allegations that the defendants' business operations emitted
greenhouse gases, those greenhouse gases contributed to global warming,
global warming increased the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina, and plaintiffs'
property was destroyed as a result, all were accepted as facts supporting
the plaintiffs' claims. The court was not concerned with whether these
allegations were indeed true, since the plaintiffs' would have the burden to
prove them at trial (a topic to be discussed later). Instead, the court was
deciding whether all of the allegations in the complaint, taken as true,
were enough to give the plaintiffs' standing to sue. Given the fact that the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts had already said that standing existed in
a very similar situation (as previously discussed), it is quite clear that the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning was essentially in line with Supreme Court
precedent.
B. Political Question
Comer also presents an interesting application of the political
question doctrine. The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that there
was no textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to one of the
political branches. 7 7  While this is true when one views the issues as
nothing more than common law tort claims, the fact remains that the
issues present such complex questions that they may have been better left
to the political branches. The court viewed the issues too narrowly. If it
were to hear the case at trial and render a decision, it would be
determining that a company's lawful emissions of greenhouse gases make
it liable for any damage that results. In essence, the question then
becomes, do the courts have that power, or should that question be decided
by the political branches? If one looks more closely at Massachusetts, it is
clear that the Supreme Court has already hinted at the answer.
While the Court in Massachusetts did not directly address this
question, its explanation of the EPA's power to limit automobile
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889.
See Comer, 585 F.3d at 872.
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emissions suggests that greenhouse gas regulation is an issue that should
not be decided by the courts. When addressing the question of whether
the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from
vehicles, the Supreme Court concluded that it did in fact grant such
authority. 178 It emphasized that "§ 202(a)(1) [of the Clean Air Act]
provides that EPA 'shall by regulation prescribe ...standards applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant ... which ... contribute[s] to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."' 7 9 The Court further noted that the Clean Air Act gave a broad
definition of the term "air pollutant," which "embraces all airborne
compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the
repeated use of the word 'any.,"'80 While the Court was only recognizing
the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles
under the Clean Air Act, it can also be viewed more broadly as an
endorsement of the EPA's broad discretion in regulating any form of
greenhouse gas emissions, even if their source is not a vehicle.
With such an endorsement of authority to regulate emissions, it
follows that the Court was in fact validating the grant of power to the EPA
through the Clean Air Act. By doing so, the Fifth Circuit was also
recognizing that Congress had the power to endow the EPA with such a
responsibility. Thus, the issue of which branch should decide how much
emissions will subject a party to liability would seem to be a question to
be decided by the legislative and executive branches, not the judiciary.
Undoubtedly the courts would retain the power to review those decisions
for their constitutionality, but it would ultimately be in the discretion of
Congress and various executive agencies to put forth any limits on
greenhouse gas emissions. So, while the Massachusetts Court did not
identify any express constitutional provision that would limit this issue to
one of the political branches, its analysis allows for the inference that such
decisions are to be made by the other branches. In viewing the issues of
Comer in such a way, it becomes clear that the first and most important
Baker factor (any material issue committed exclusively to a political
178 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007).
17 Id.
1so Id. at 528-29.
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branch by the Constitution or other federal laws) could be decided in a
different way.
This interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts can also affect other Baker factors. Comer mentioned the
other Baker factors, but dismissed them without much discussion.'' The
court said that the Defendants did not show any absence of judicially
manageable and discoverable standards regarding the case, nor did they
show that the case would require the court to make initial policy
determinations to decide the issues.182 Furthermore, it said that the
resolution of the case would not "imply any lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of the federal government," and there was no need for
adherence to the decision of a political branch.183 However, the court's
lack of an explanation in its application of the Baker factors once again
reveals that it may have viewed the issues too narrowly, and thus decided
a case that would have been better left to the political branches.
The court narrowed its view of the issues to the plaintiffs'
common law tort claims of negligence, trespass and nuisance.l 4 While
these were the claims presented, the issues involved went beyond those
traditional torts, particularly regarding the problems with causation. In
order to decide the case once it goes to trial, the court would have to
determine if the plaintiffs satisfied their burden of proof on the issue of
causation. To do this, it would have to make a determination of what
exactly would satisfy that burden of proof. This would present numerous
problems for any court. For example, how can someone show that the
emissions given off by a particular company contributed to global
warming? How would the court determine if those emissions actually
contributed to the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina? How much did the
emissions contribute? What would have been the damage wrought by the
storm if those emissions were never introduced into the atmosphere?
These are just of a few of the questions the Fifth Circuit would be forced
to determine, and the plaintiffs would be forced to prove, before a decision
could be made.
181 Comer, 585 F.3d at 875-76.
12 Id. at 875.Id. at 875-76.
184 See id. at 875.
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Moreover, these questions involve standards and policy
determinations that the court is not prepared to make. No judicially
discoverable and manageable standards govern these issues. They are best
left to the executive agencies that have the expertise in deciding such
matters. Going back to Massachusetts, it is clear that the Supreme Court
felt that such determinations were well within the EPA's power to decide,
and that Congress had the authority to grant that power to the EPA. This
would make the issues in Comer fit squarely into two of the Baker factors
by presenting a claim that requires non-judicial policy determinations and
has an absence of judicially manageable standards.
Additionally, there is the potential for embarrassment from
multiple pronouncements by various federal departments on the question.
The defendants' actions in this case were lawful; their greenhouse gas
emissions did not violate any federal statute or regulation. The EPA's
choice not to regulate these emissions, and Congress's choice not to
develop legislation addressing the problem, can be viewed as a
pronouncement by omission. Their lack of regulation towards the
defendants' emissions is a pronouncement that such actions are lawful and
will not subject the companies to liability. If the Fifth Circuit were to
decide otherwise, not only would it be creating a new form of liability not
authorized by Congress, but it would also provide different
pronouncements from two federal departments. Thus, when one views the
issues involved in Comer more broadly than did the Fifth Circuit, the
Baker factors play a much more important role on the issue of whether the
plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions.
C. Implications
While Comer presents a new take on the issues of standing and the
political question doctrine in an environmental context, it also has other
broad and far-reaching implications. To begin with, it is part of the
beginning of a possible trend among the federal circuits to grant standing
in cases involving common law tort claims for damages caused by global
warming, and to find that the claims do not present a nonjusticiable
political question.
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On Sept. 21, 2009, the Second Circuit issued its decision on
remand from Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,"8 5 and held that
the plaintiffs had standing to bring their nuisance claim.'8 6 The court also
held that the claim did not present a non-judiciable political question. 87
The court's analysis of the political question issue applied the Baker
factors and concluded that in the absence of federal legislation directly
addressing greenhouse gas emissions by private companies, parties are
free to bring actions for nuisance. 188 The court also found that the
plaintiffs met the test for standing set out in Lujan.189 Less than a month
after this decision, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Comer; and while
the court reached a result similar to that of the Second Circuit, its
reasoning was somewhat different. Still, these two cases together
represent the beginning of a split in the circuits regarding climate change
litigation.
The Ninth Circuit may also join the Second and Fifth soon.
Shortly before the Second Circuit's decision in Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co.,190 the Northern District of California decided Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.191 In that case, the Village of
Kivalina brought suit against multiple energy companies for nuisance.1 92
The Village alleged "that as a result of global warming, the Arctic sea ice
that protects the Kivalina coast from winter storms has diminished, and
that the resulting erosion and destruction will require the relocation of
Kivalina's residents." 93 The court concluded that the claim presented was
precluded by the second and third Baker factors (lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards, and the need for the court to make
an initial policy determination), and thus it was a political question that the
court could not decide.' 94 It also found that the chain of causation was too
" 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
186 Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 309, 349 (2nd Cir. 2009).
"Id. at 332.
' Id. at 323-32.
1 Id. at 338.
190 583 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
191 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
'
92 Id. at 868.
1 Id.
194 Id. at 876-77.
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attenuated to establish standing for the plaintiffs.' 95 Consequently, the
court held that the "[p]laintiffs' federal claim for nuisance is barred by the
political question doctrine and for lack of standing under Article II."l 96
While this case comes to the opposite conclusion of Comer, it is still
important because it will most likely go up on appeal, giving the Ninth
Circuit the opportunity to overturn the District Court's ruling and join the
Second and Fifth Circuits in their treatment of this issue.
Another possible implication of Comer is that it may open up the
door to similar lawsuits. The action in Comer was not brought by states or
municipalities seeking injunctive relief, but by parties seeking damages in
a class action suit. The prospect of lucrative damage awards and
contingency fees is sure to entice plaintiffs and lawyers alike to bring
more cases like the one in Comer.19  J. Russell Jackson, a Skadden Arps
partner who specializes in mass tort litigation, said that "[w]ith this
decision, you are now pretty well assured of seeing others file these kinds
of claims."' With the potential of seeing many "copy cat" suits to follow
Comer, climate change litigation may in fact turn out to be the new
asbestos litigation of our time. 199 It also has the ability to develop more
quickly than asbestos litigation, owing to the increased concern over
200greenhouse gas emissions and the threat of global warming.
Even if one disregards the potential for similar lawsuits arising
from Comer, the case may still have another effect on energy companies
195 Id. at 881.
196 Id. at 883.
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operating in the United States. The prospect of paying huge damage
awards in multiple class action suits could drive the companies to the
negotiating table, whether they are prepared to admit liability or not. It
would be a prudent option for these companies to end these lawsuits
before they even begin. By settling out of court, or before the suit is even
brought, they will be able to stop the prospect of being found liable for
their contribution to global warming before the courts even have the
chance to rule on the issue. They may also be able to secure a
confidentiality agreement, thereby minimizing the amount of similar
claims being brought against them. On the other hand, it may in fact be
better for these companies in the long run if they furiously litigate the
claims now, and bar any possible future suits by securing a favorable
ruling from the courts. Either way, climate change lawsuits do not seem
to be going away anytime soon. One way or another this issue needs to be
resolved, whether it is by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Courts, or the
actions of the companies themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's decision that private parties have standing to
bring suit against energy companies for their contribution to global
warming, and that such a suit does not involve a political question, has the
potential to be far-reaching and ripe for Supreme Court review. If the
other circuits follow suit, an entirely new avenue of global warming
litigation will be opened up, with the possibility of turning into the new
equivalent of asbestos litigation. While the court's decision on the issue
of standing was directly in line with Supreme Court precedent, its analysis
of the issues under the political question doctrine does provide plenty of
points for criticism and speculation. Regardless, the effects of the
decision now will continue to be felt by major energy companies, and may
force them to the negotiating table despite their reluctance to acknowledge
liability.
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